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RESISTING MIGRAI'ION: THE
PROBLEMS OF WAGE RIGIDITY
AND THE SOCIAL BURDEN
ABSTRACT
Just like any trade activity in well-functioning markets, migrationtendsto enhance the
efficiency of the allocation of resources. With non-distortionary income distribution policy
instruments which can compensate losers, migration generates income gains. But the gains tend
to be typically rather small. However, when the labor market is malfunctioning and wages are
rigid, migration exacerbates imperfections in the market. Consequently, it may lead to losses to
the established population which can be quite sizable.
Another problem raised by migration is the toll it imposes on the welfare state. Being
unable to perfectly exclude migrants from various entitlement programs and public services, the
modem welfare state finds it more and more costly to run its various programs.
These two economic considerations may help explain why there is strong resistance to
migration. Consequently, improvements in functioning of the labor markets (with a possible
compensation to wage earners that compete with unskilled migrants) and more selectivity in the
scope of and the eligibility for the state entitlement programs may potentially ease, to a large
extent, the resistance to migratii.; from the established population.
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The conventional wisdom of welfare economics is that a free flow of goods and factors of
production (including labor) enhances the efficiency of the allocation of resources. Migration
which typically shifts workers from economies with low productivity of labor to economies
with high productivity of labor can accordingly raise global output. It is also well known
that generally a country tends to inaease its income (domestic output, minus wage payments
to migrants). Even though certain sectors in the receiving country (e.g. native workers
that are a substitute for migrants) may suffer income loss, there are conceivably some non-
distortionary lump-sum redistribution mechanisms that enlarge the share of all sectors in
the national pie.
Nevertheless, in practi';t, one may often find a widespread resistance to guest workers
.n migrants in the receiving (destination) cuuntry. In this paper we highlight two economic
considerations that may explain the reasons behind such resistance.
First, when wages are rigid (due to unionism, search costs, efficiency wage elements,
etc.), migration may well lower the total share of the native population (skilled labor, un-
skilled labor, capital, etc.) in the domestic output.' Furthermore, while with flexible wages
the gain from migration is miniscule, with wage rigidity, migration may inflict a substantial
loss to the native population. Also, with wage rigidity migration induces a misallocation of
inve..tment between human and yihvsical capital.
Second, low-income migrants increase the economic costs of non lump-sum income
'It is true that the majority of unemployed people in Europe, ibr example, are second-generation migrants.
But the unemployment rate emanating from wage rigidity for the native population also rises as a result of
migration. For instance, the unemployment rate for ethnic Germans rose by about one third between 1989
and 1C3 as a result of the East-West migration.2
redistribution policies (which are inevitably more common in practice), thereby imposing a
burden on the modern welfare state. For instance, a typ3cal welfare state may find it impos-
sibleto redistribute income in a way that makes all sectors better off. Indeed, the opposite
may be true; all may lose from migration (e.g. Wildasin (1991). Thus, one may conjecture
that resistance to migration should be stronger and more widespread in economies with less
wage flexibility and more comprehensive welfare programs (such as many of the countries
in Western Europe) than in economies with more wage flexibility and less comprehensive
welfare progxanus (such as the United States).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the effects of wage rigidity and
investment in physical and hinan capital on the potential gains from migration. Section
3describesthe implications of the modern welfare state for the welfare gains (losses) from
migration. We conclude the paper in Section 4.
2 Wage Flexibility and Migration
Following Saint-Paul (1994), we assume a stylized economy in which there are only two
types of labor productivity: "low" and "high". While a high productivity worker provides
one efficiency unit of labor, the low productivity worker provides only p C1efficiency units of
labor. A person can acquire education which makes her a high-productivity worker (denoted
"skilled" worker). If she does not acquire education she remains a low-productivity worker
(denoted "unskilled" worker). There is a continuum of individuals varying in their cost of
acquiring education (due to innate ability). We assume that the distribution of these costs
in the population is uniform over the interval [0, e].
Eachindividual can either invest in human capital (through education) or in physical
capital (which yields a return r). There exists a cut-off cost level, C, such that all those3
with education-cost below C invest in human capital and become skilled workers while all
the rest remain unskilled. Denoting the wage per efficiency unit by w,thecut-off cost level
is determined by an equality between the marginal r.ta:n and marginal opportunity cost
(via investment in physical capital) to education:
(1 +r)c= [(1—u1)—p—u2)}w, (1)
where is,isthe unemployment rate among workers of type i(wherei =Idenotes "skilled"
and i =2denotes "unskilled".) Notice that in calculating the return to education, one must
take into account the differential wage and the probability of attaining employment for skill
level i (namely, 1 —is1).
Thus,the proportion (x) of skilled 'corkers in the total population is given by:
z =cft. (2)
Therefore, a total of
Jc,I)dc= (c")3/2öH (3)
is invested in human capital.
Denoting by I the initial ciowment, the endogenously determined stock of physical
capital (K) is given by:
I(=I—H. (4)
Finally, we specify a Cobb-Douglas production function for the CDP of this economy
with constant returns to scale:4
Y =AJC°L1, (5)
where
L =x(I—ui)+p(1 —x)(1 —u2)+pm (6)
is the input of labor in efficiency units.2 (Notice that the two types of labor are assumed,
for simplicity, to be perfect substitutes in production.) The proportion of unskilled migrants
in the native labor force is denoted by in. To sharpen the analysis we assume that physical
capital does not depreciate, but human capital depreciates fully, thus Y + K is available for
consumption at the end of the production process. The wage rate (w) and the return to




We now explore two market regimes. In the first, thewages are flexible and completely clear
the Labor market. In the second re,'ime wages are rigid, which gives rise to unemployment.
We now turn to these two cases.
2Note that the native labor force is normalized to one.5
2.1Flexible Wage
Toset a benchmark case we start with perfect wage flexibility (the market.clearing case), and
no unemployment, that is, u1 =is2=0.Given the proportion of migrants (iii), equations
(1 )-(8) determine the equilibrium levels of wp-, r, ci., xp, H,, K', 1',., and LF as functions
of m. (The subscript F stands for the "Flexible" wage iicdel.)
The aggregate consumption of native workers and native capital owners3 is taken as a
welfare indicator (W). This measure is equal to GNP (that is, GDP, minus wage payments
to foreign labor), plus the underpreciated stock of physical capital. Thus, the change of the
welfare measure due to migration is given by:
AW, =LYsYp+ AK, -w,(m)prm (9)
where AZ =Zp(rn) — Z,(O).nd ZF =Wp,}', Kp.
Graphically, AW can be illustrated with the help of the marginal product of labor
schedule in Figure 1. Accordingly, let the schedule denoted by MP describe the marginal
product of labor at the pre-migration stock '/ capital (that is, Ki'(O)). If migration would not
change the stocks of physical capital (K,-) and human capital (z,), we obtain the standard
measure of the gains from migration, which is represented by the area of the triangle ABC.
However, since the wage per efficiency unit falls, the return to human capital falls as well
and therefore investment is shifted from human capital to physical capital. As a result, the
MPL curve rises and the supply cE effective labor falls. The additional adjustment must
raise the total gain from migration (over the standard measure of gain), accruing to both
natives and migrants because the underlying competitive allpcation is Pareto-efficient (for
every exogenously given level of migration).










We I c r e
,6
However, the gain to veterans which is the focus of our attention here (as measured
by equation (9)) may actually fall by this adjustment in the stocks of physical and human
capit:.I becauseof thefamiliar terms-of•trade effect. The initial (pre-adjustment) decline
in w lowers the return to human capital and increases the return to physical capital. As a
result, the induced adjustment in the allocation of investment raises the stock of physical
capital and lowers the stock of human capital. Consequently, the ratio of physical capital
to labor (in efficiency units) rises and wrisesas well. fl'is, the capital stock adjustments
lead to a deterioration in the terms of the trade of the receiving country; that is, the
wage paid on imports of labor services (of the migrants) increases. This wage increase may
actually more than offset the efficiency gains resulting from the adjustments in the capital
stock. Nevertheless, altogether the destination country must gain from migration because
the classical gains-from.trade argument is still valid.
Table 1 illustrates the magnitude of the gains from migration. It turns out that
the standard gain which accrues to the veterans for fixed K, H and x (the familiar triangle
ABC in Figure 1) is quite small; A mig:rton of the size of 10% of the existing population
generates a gain to the veterans amounting to 0.045% of their consumption. The induced
shift of investment from human to physical capital actually reduces this gain in our setup,
but not by much, to 0.044%.7




































The gain is measured as a percentage of the aggregate consumption of the native
population which is equal to GNF + K.
















Cotisider now some imperfections in the labor market which prevent wages from fully ad-
justing downward so as to fully clear the market in the wake of migration. Consequently,
migration must create unemployment among the native workers. There are quite a few
attempts in the literature to model imperfections in the labor market and the reason for
persistent unemployment (e.g. Layard and Nickell (1990), Pissarides (1990)). To sharpen
the analysis we make the extreme assumption that wages are frozen at their pre-migration
market-clearing levels.
Strictly speaking, it does not matter in in this model whether migrants are skilled or
unskilled since the various labor types are assumed to be perfect substitutes. All that matters
is how much labor in efficiency units has been brought in with migration. Nevertheless, as a
matter of interpretation, we assume that the migrants are all unskilled and that they replace
only unskilled native workers, since skilled workers have typically some advantage in the job
market over unskilled workers.
In this case, we have is1'andwa is fixed at the pre-migration wage level, that is
WR =wF(0).(The subscript 1?standsfor the "Rigid" wage model.) Thus, for any given
level of m, equations (1 )-(8) determine 112R,rR,c, 1R, HR, "R, YR and LR as functions of in.
In essence w and is2 change roles between the flexible and rigid wage models. In the flexible
wage model, is2 =0and w is determined by the market-clearing condition in the labor
marke... In the rigid wage model, wisfixed (at the pre-migration, flexible wage equilibrium
level) and is2 is equal to the excess supply of labor.
Schedule MC in Figure 2 describes the marginal product of labor for the pre-rnigration9
stockof capital (KR(O)).Pre-migration CNP is thus measured by the area OMCD. If K and
xwerefixed migration will reduceGNP to an amount rtpr.:entedbythe area OMCTA, a loss
which is measuredby the areaofthe rectangleATCD. However, sinceunemploymentamong
the unskilled workers rises, theexpectedreturn to education must rise as well (see equation
(1)). Hence, achunk of investmentswitchesfromphysical tohuman capital. Thus,K must
falland x must rise, which leads to an even further increase in unskilled labor unemployment.
The marginal product of labor schedule shifts downward to NB and the post-adjustment
GNP is measured by the area ONBGQ. Thus, the fall in K and the increase in x induce an
additional loss in GNP by an amount which is measured by the sum of the areas NMCB
and QGTA. In addition, aggregate coni iption of the native population falls also by the
amount in which K falls. (Recall that aggregate consumption of the native population is
equal to GNP, plus the undepreciated capital stock owned by the native population.)
It is useful to compare the two cases: the flexible and the rigid wage cases In the
former case, the migration per se (even before adjustment in the allocation of investment
between human and physical capital) raises the welfare of the native population. In the
absence of market-distortions, the induced adjustment in the two forms of capital (i.e. a
shift from human to physical capital resulting from the wage decline) further enhances global
efficiency and thereby raises the wekare of the native population as well. This efficiency gain
may be more than offset by the deterioration in the termsof trade (that is, the rise of the
wage paid to migrants). In the case of wage rigidity, however,the migration per se lowered
the welfare of the native population, since foreign labor merely drove out domestic labor.
The induced reallocation of investmentfrom physical to human capital further reduces the
welfare of the existing population. Indeed, the additional investment in human capital is a
total loss, in the sense that even a penny of the investment is not recovered.4 Nevertheless,
4This measure of 1c68isreduced lithe depreciation of human capital over the working period is less than10
the private net yield to the individual making the investr.nt is positive, thereby producing
the (socially wrong) market incentive for such an investment.
It turns out that the extra loss in GNP, due to the reallocation of investment between
human and physical capital, relative to the loss that results from the mere substitution of
native workers by migrants is quite substantial. Table 2 illustrates the relative magnitudes
of these two measures of loss. When migrants make up 10 percent of the native population,
the loss due to the reallocation of investment is about as much as 1/7th of the total loss. Our
sensitivity analysis suggests that when the share of capital in CDP (namely, a) is lowered
rom 1/3 to 1/4, the standard loss rises frcr:. 2.98% of consumption to 3.3% and the total loss
rises from 3.43% to 3.97%. Thus, the relative importance of the loss due to the reallocation
of investment rises from 1/6th to 1/7th of the total loss. An increase in the productivitygap
between skilled and unskilled labor (i.e. a decline in p) also raises the relative importance of
the loss due to the reallocation of investment from physical to human capital: from 14% to
18% of the total loss.
full.But sincethe initial endowment, I is fixed (which is spFt between K andH)is fixed,therates of
depreciation ofthetwoformsof capital are of a second-order imp.Y!cance for overallwelfare calculus.ii
Table 2: Losses from Migi,ation
Rigid Wages
Percentage of Loss from Loss from Total
Migrants in theSubstitution Reallocation of Loss
Native Populationof Domestic Investment
Labor bybetween Human and
________________FztreignLabrrPhysical Capital_____
2 0.60 0.07 0.67
4 1.19 0.16 1.35
6 1.79 I 0.25 2.04
8 2.40 0.33 2.73
10 2.98 0.45 3.43
Note:
aTheloss is measured ac a percentage of the aggregate consumption of the native
population which is equal to GNP + K.
The parameter values are: a =0.33,p =0.75,=2,I =1,A =1.12
3The Welfare State and M igrat;n
Income distribution makes a developed welfare state more attractive to poor migrants from
less developed countries, even when these migrants do not qualify for all the ingredients
of the entitlement programe. Therefore, migration has strong implication for the welfare
of the veteran residents in the destination country. These considerations were presented
by Wildasin (1991) in a stylized model with one immobile factor whose distribution is the
underlying source of inequality and internationally mobile homogenous workers (natives and
migrants).
The curves MPLc and MPC in Figure 3 portray the marginal products of labor
in the Destination Country (DC) and the Source Country (SC), respectively. Stappose that
the immobile factor is capital and that it is wned by immobile residents. Also consider the
income distribution in the DC between the capital-owners and the original native workers.
Assume that initially the allocation of (native) workers between the DC and the SC is at
point A in Figure 3 and no migration is allowed. The income of workers is represented by the
area OocQHA and the income of capital-owners by the area QRH. This initial distribution
of income is represented by pointirt Figure 4. Suppose redistribution takes the form of a
subsidy (possibly negative) to workers, financed by a lump-sum tax on capital-owners. We
assume that the supply of labor of each worker is perfectly inelastic. Hence this redistribution
scheme creates no distortions, i.e., the size of the national pie remains unchanged. Thus,
the income redistribution frontier is a straight line with a slope of unity (in absolute terms)
-theline FAH in Figure 4.
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the DC (i.e., the subsidy to workers in the DC is zero), then AB workers will migrate from
the SC to the DC. The wages in the DC fall from ODcQ to Ojx,T and the total income of
the native workers in the DC falls from ODCQHA to ODcTFA. At the same time, income
of capital-owners rises from QRH to TRE. The total iau;rne of native workers and capital-
owners rises from ODCRHA to O00REPA. Thus, the income distribution point in this case,
denoted by M in Figure 4, lies to the northwest of point A and outside the no-migration
income redistribution frontier FAH.
Now, suppose that redistribution takes place in the DC, and let us trace out in Figure
4 the income redistribution frontier in this case. A subsidy to workers in the DC raises the
demand curve for workers in the DC from MPfC to "MFr + Subsidy." The subsidy
brings more migrants to the DC, raises the wage received by workers (natives, migrants and
"those left behind"), raises the total inc..nte of native workers in the DC, but lowers the
net income of DC's capital-owners. (Note that the subsidy to labor is financed by a lump-
sum tax on capital). The subsidy is no longer distortion-fr, and the income redistribution
frontier is no longer a straight line with a unitary slope. Recall that the total wage of native
workers in the no-migration, no-subsidy case was OncQ in Figure 3 and their total income
was ON in Figure 4. Now, suppose that with migration we still want to preserve the income
level ON of native workers. The amount of the subsidy that is required for this purpose is
VZ in Figure 3. An amount of AF workers migrates to the DC in this case. Total income
of capital-owners is equal to totai autput (OvcRZF in Figure 3), less total wage income,
induding the wage subsidy (which is equal to the tax levied on capital), received by workers
(ODCQVF in Figure 3). That is, total income of capital owners in the DC is equal to QRII,
minus HVZ. This income is obviously smaller than QRH. Thus, the income redistribution
frontier with migration passes below point A (say, K) in Figure 4.14
Migration therefore changes the income redistri5:..t ion frontier in an interesting way.
In a certain range, migration shifts the frontier outward while in some other ranges the
frontier moves inwardly. With no redistribution, migration lowers the income of native
workers and raises the income of native capital-owners. If a redistribution scheme attempts
to preserve for native workers at least the income that they had before migration (at the point
of no redistribution), it must make capitaiists worse off than they were in the pre-migration
state, and vice cersa. In the neighborhood of K and to the left of it, both native groups
(workers and capitalists) are worse off than in the absence of migration. Therefore, both of
them will opt for imposing ir;vnigration ciuotas or some other restrictions on immigration.
The modern welfare state is therefore more receptive (on economic grounds) to the idea of
restricting immigration, a hypothesis that is yet to be tested empirically.
4Conclusion
Just like any trade activity in well-functioning markets, migration enhances the efficiency
of the allocation of resources,Vith non-distortionary income distribution policy instruments
whia can compensate losers, mi.rition generates income gains to all parties involved: the
migrants as well as the established population. But these gains tend to be typically rather
low. However, when the labor market is rnal-functioning, migration exacerbates irnperfec-
tions in the market. Consequently, it may lead to losses to the veteran population which can
be quite sizable.
Another problem raised by migration is the toll it imposes on the welfare state. Being
unable to perfectly exclude migrants from various entitlement programs and public services,
the modern welfare state finds it more and more costly to run its various programs.15
These two economic considerations may help explain why there is strong resistance
to migration. Consequently, an improvement in the functioning of the labor market (with
a possible compensation to wage earners that compete with unskilled migrants) andmore
selectivity in the scope of and the eligibility for the st3t•; entitlement programs will there-
fore ease, to a large extent potentially, the resistance to migration from the established
population.16
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